Commercial policy, trade and competition in the Norwegian service industries by Fæhn, Taran & Grünfeld, Leo A.

97/18 	 Rapporter 	 Reports
Taran Fæhn and Leo A. Grünfeld
Commercial Policy, Trade and
Competition in the Norwegian
Service Industries
Statistisk sentralbyrå • Statistics Norway
Oslo-Kongsvinger
Standardtegn i tabeller
Tall kan ikke forekomme
Oppgave mangler
Oppgave mangler foreløpig
Tall kan ikke offentliggjøres
Null
Symbols in tables 
Category not applicable
Data not available
Data not yet available
Not for publication
Nil
Symbol     
Mindre enn 0,5
av den brukte enheten
Mindre enn 0,05
av den brukte enheten
Foreløpige tall
Brudd i den loddrette serien
Brudd i den vannrette serien
Rettet siden forrige utgave
Less than 0.5 of unit
employed
Less than 0.05 of unit
employed
Provisional or preliminary figure
Break in the homogeneity of a vertical series
Break in the homogeneity of a horizontal series






I denne serien publiseres statistiske analyser, metode- og modellbeskrivelser fra de
enkelte forsknings- og statistikkområder. Også resultater av ulike enkeltunder-
søkelser publiseres her, oftest med utfyllende kommentarer og analyser.
This series contains statistical ananlyes and method and model descriptions from the
different research and statistics areas. Results of various single surveys are also
published here, usually with supplementary comments and analyses.
© Statistisk sentralbyrå, august 1997
Ved bruk av materiale fra denne publikasjonen,











Design: Enzo Finger Design
Trykk: Statistisk sentralbyrå
Abstract
saran Fæhn and Leo A. Grein feld
Commercial Policy, Trade and Competition in the Norwegian Service Industries
Reports 97/18 • Statistics Norway 1997
This report evaluates the relevance of classifying all service industries as sheltered, as done in several applied
macroeconomic models. For this purpose, a substantial part of the paper is devoted to establish a conceptual
framework for the study of service industries, the particular market structures they are placed in and the political
conditions imposed on them. On the basis of the theoretical discussion and the empirical fact that Norwegian services
are more and more traded internationally, we conclude that several types of services should be reclassified as
tradables. Moreover, our findings suggest that service industries have strong elements of monopolistic competition
between differentiated products, fixed costs, as well as governmental regulations and protection. These
characteristics are essential to account for, when modelling service activities.
The large appendix discusses the implementation of our conclusions into an input-output price model, the ERA
(Effective Rates of Assistance) model of Statistics Norway. As compared to the old version of this model, we suggest a
new division between exposed and sheltered industries, and provide a framework for quantifying and modelling
regulation and protection of service industries. The ERA model is, however, found too simple to satisfactorily account
for all aspects of imperfect competition
Keywords: Macro modelling, Protection, Regulations, Service trade
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Norwegian Ministry of Finance. We are grateful to Erling Ho'm y and Ådne Cappelen for comments on earlier drafts.
3

Reports 97/18	 Policy, Trade and Competition in Service Industries
Contents
1. Introduction 	 7
2. The distinction between goods and services 	 9
3. International trade in services 	 10
4. Figures on trade in services 	 11
4.1. The statistical sources 	 11
4.2. Some aggregate observations 	 11
4.3. Trade at a more disaggregate level 	 12
4.4. A discussion on the tradability of services 	 15
5. Natural barriers to entry and trade in service markets 	 16
6. Political barriers to entry and trade in service markets 	 18
6.1. Government regulations vs. protection 	 18
6.2. Rationales for regulations and protection 	 18
6.3. Common regulation measures 	 19
6.4. Common protection measures 	 20
6.5. Regulation and protection of the Norwegian service industries 	 20
7. Conclusions 	 25
References 	 26
Appendix 	 29
Application to the ERA model 	 28
Tidligere utgitt på emneområdet 	 33
De sist utgitte publikasjonene i serien Rapporter 	 34
5

Reports 97/18	 Policy, Trade and Competition in Service Industries
1. Introduction
Most disaggregated computable general economic
models split industries into two categories; those that
are exposed to foreign competitors and those that are
naturally sheltered. This is also true for the most
frequently used CGE models for Norway, see e.g.
Haaland et al. (1988), Haaland and Norman (1992),
Mathiesen (1992) and Holmøy, Norden and Strøm
(1994) 1 . The separation is theoretically motivated by
their different price determination. While prices of
non-tradables depend exclusively on domestic factors,
prices of tradables are influenced by the behaviour of
foreigners. In traditional Hekscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
(HOS)-models, domestic prices of tradables are
completely determined by world markets.
Empirically, the classification in most Norwegian
models still resemble the division made in the inflation
model PRIM of the late sixties. As documented in
Aukrust (1971), industries that had a relatively
constant profits to wage costs ratio were defined as
sheltered. This choice was based on the idea that
changes in costs except wages among sheltered
industries, were shifted on to prices in order to
maintain normal profits. In contrast, strong empirical
fluctuation in the profit rates relative to wages were
interpreted as a consequence of externally determined
prices. Industries with such profit rate performance
were defined as exposed. Most service industries, along
with production of electricity, were categorised as
naturally sheltered. And this pattern has been
maintained until today in most macroeconomic models
of the Norwegian economy'.
In contrast to this persistency, the registered share of
services in trade has increased dramatically during the
last 25 years, due to technological progress, changing
preferences and strong efforts to liberalise and
1 In two of the most frequently applied macro econometric models
of the Norwegian economy, MODAG and KVARTS, the partition is
not that marked, as pricing behaviour in each industry is tested with
respect to domestic, as well as to foreign, external factors.
2 Also in applied models where the impact of foreign pricing
behaviour on domestic service prices is ex ante allowed for,
econometric testing tends to rule out this correlation or render it
small.
integrate the European economies. The share of
services in total imports and exports increased from
about 10 percent in 1969 to about 30 percent in
19943. In addition, there is an inherent downward bias
in the statistical material, as trade in services is difficult
to register. Further, appearance of trade is not a
necessary condition for prices being affected by the
pricing behaviour of foreign competitors. Foreign direct
investments (FDI) represent another manifestation.
Also in absence of FDIs and trade, threat of foreign
competition may discipline domestic pricing behaviour.
The classification method of Aukrust hinges on the
validity of the traditional HOS model as an explanation
for the pricing behaviour. New models of industrial
organisation and international trade may provide
alternative explanations for variability in profit rates
and/or prices. There are also other shortcomings of the
Aukrust method. First, it ignores the distinction
between naturally and politically sheltered industries.
Second, the level of aggregation of the observations
veil important variation within an industry, a problem
that is not properly taken care of in the PRIM model.
Observations, as well as new theoretical achievements
clearly illuminate the progressive need for a critical
evaluation of the way international competition is
modelled.
This report provides recent data on trade in services 4
and maps the political conditions under which trade
and competition take place. These observations are
linked to a theoretical framework, which accounts for
the characteristic features of services. These features
have implications for how services are traded, for the
industrial organisations of their markets, as well as for
the design of commercial policies directed towards
them. The analysis concludes that the understanding of
service industries as sheltered, is ripe for revision. A
comprehensive appendix sketches how the empirical
and principle features of the service markets could be
implemented into a disaggregated input-output price
3 Statistical Yearbook (1996).
4 We have not considered trade statistics for the public service
sector, as its activities are hard to measure and model.
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model, which assumes constant unit costs and perfect
competition. This model is chosen at the current stage,
due to its simplicity. Parts of the application have
interest for model implementation in general, but the
presented model is not complex enough to do justice to
all the aspects of service trade and competition.
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2. The distinction between goods and
services
Two characteristics of services are often emphasised in
order to distinguish services from goods:
1) Production and consumption of a service must appear
simultaneously.
Communication services are good examples here. Once
you call someone on the phone, the telephone
company must instantaneously respond by producing
the requested line connection. Unless production and
consumption is performed simultaneously, the service
cannot be provided. Alternatively, one may claim that
such services are non-storable. However, a
considerable amount of services, like R&D, business
consulting, literature and film and video services are
easily stored and do not demand the outlined
production-consumption simultaneity. Hence, the
simultaneity condition is not a necessary condition for
an activity to be characterised as a service.
2) Services have an intangible or non-material nature.
Services cannot be measured in traditional volume or
metric terms. In his seminal paper «On goods and
services», Hill (1977) defined services on the basis of the
transformation of goods and agents. He claimed that a
service is supplied by one economic agent as a trans-
formation of an already existing good or consumer.
Here, the production of a movie may serve as a good
example. In physical terms, a movie is only a trans-
formation of an existing, yet empty roll of film. But the
demand for a movie is first of all linked to the value of
entertainment which again can be interpreted as a
qualitative transformation of a consumer or economic
agent in terms of his way of apprehending the world.
The same story could be told about other entertainment
activities as well as hotel- and restaurant services,
cosmetic-, health- and fitness related services, etc.
Both the simultaneity condition and the intangible
nature of services may require that suppliers and
consumers are physically located at the same place. This
is especially so if the provision of a service rests on the
participation of both producers and consumers, as is the
case in education, most kinds of personnel trans-
portation, hair dressing, restaurant services, retail trade,
etc. And furthermore, as we will discuss later, the
physical appearance of service suppliers also often
generates a competitive advantage, since the quality and
reliability of a service is more easily corrected and
controlled by the consumer when it is possible to
communicate directly with the actual supplier. This way,
physical proximity is regarded as a quality enhancement.
Furthermore, due to the intangible nature, the
simultaneity condition and the question of geographic
proximity, services are easily differentiable. The same
service provided in Oslo and Tokyo are still different
due to location. Moreover, even taxi services provided
along the same route may differ dramatically due to
the way it is driven, the way the driver acts and the
quality of the car. Hence, the numerous possibilities for
differentiation enable the producers to engage in a
monopolistically competitive market.
According to Tirole (1988), the quality or properties of
a good cannot always be identified before it is
purchased or consumed. Tirole labels such goods as
experience goods (quality can only be ascertained after
consumption) or credence goods (it is not possible to
identify the level of quality) . Apparently, most services
are experience goods, both because production and
consumption is performed simultaneously and because
services often are highly differentiated. Consequently,
consumers face a problem of asymmetric information
and become the uninformed principal in a moral
hazard situation. Since the consumer is financially
responsible regardless of quality, and can not
distinguish reduced producer efforts from accidental or
random reductions in quality, the service producer has
less incentive to provide a high quality product.
However, if the service producer operates in a market
where repeated purchases are common, the consumer
can monitor the service quality over time and demand
reduced prices at later stages. Alternatively, to avoid
some of the information disadvantages, consumers can
co-operate by generating systems of reputation
regarding service providers. Hence, reputation becomes
one of the most important factors of competition. As
Sapir (1991) points out, service producers often
become multinational to be able to follow consumers
wherever they have an reputational advantage.
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3. International trade in services
If one cannot provide services unless producers and
consumers are located at the same place, is it then
possible to trade services internationally? And
moreover, is it possible to trade something
internationally that has no physical substance?
Obviously, in terms of the concept of traditional trade
in goods and factors, service trade is not possible.
However, not all provision of services depend on
physical proximity since some services can either be
transported electronically or linked to 1 encapsulated
into a physical substance (disc, document, film, etc.).
Even though the service per se is not internationally
mobile, the producers and consumers can travel abroad
to engage in international service trade, as e.g. tourism.
According to Sapir et al. (1993), international trade in
services can be performed in 4 different ways:
Type 1) Services are traded electronically or physically
encapsulated between two locations.
Type 2) Consumers travel abroad to purchase services.
This kind of purchaser mobility is associated to e.g.
health services, air and railroad transport, education
and tourism.
Type 3) Producers travel abroad to provide services.
Such activities are often observed within the
construction and engineering industries and in the
business consulting market, where the permanent
presence of a supplier is not regarded as necessary.
Type 4) Producers establish a branch abroad to
provide services on a continuos basis. To the extent
that foreign direct investments are believed to impact
the pricing behaviour of domestic firms, this category
of foreign competition will be considered as inter-
national trade. Providers of banking and insurance
services, transport and distribution services, as well as
retail trade services, frequently prefer to establish
offices in the country of interest.
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4. Figures on trade in services
4.1. The statistical sources
Since services are not included in the statistics of
external trade, Statistics Norway applies a wide range
of sources to generate National Accounts (NA) data on
trade in services'. The primary source is the foreign
exchange statistics, which specifies the purpose of
every larger currency transaction in Norway on a quite
disaggregated level. Maritime transport statistics and
oil and gas activity statistics are used to generate
figures for services in these industries. The tourist
statistics is applied in combination with foreign
exchange statistics to estimate Norwegian consumption
abroad and foreigners consumption in Norway.
Furthermore, air transport statistics helps us to
generate figures on air traffic trade, and trade figures
on telephone and post services are partly based on
accounting figures provided by the public monopolies
in telecommunication and postal services. It is
important to notice, that in accordance with
international standards, only a fraction of the foreign
direct investments in Norway (type 4 trade) are
categorised as foreign establishments in NA. In general,
foreign subsidiaries and branches are registred as
Norwegian enterprises and their activity is thus not
registred as foreign competition in the trade statistics.
The symmetric case applies to Norwegian direct
investments abroad.
4.2. Some aggregate observations
The 1992 Current Account (CA) and NA figures for
imports and exports of services are presented in Table
1. Out of total exports and imports registered in the CA
in 1992, services represented 28 and 34 percent,
respectively. A closer look at the CA shows that
international shipping activities dominate the trade
figures. The industry is highly internationalised and the
majority of the vessels are registered outside of Norway
or in the Norwegian international ship register.
Services related to travelling and tourism are also
prominent in the trade figures. So are services
encompassed by the residual category other services.
5 A documentation is found in Fløttum (1980) and in a later
unpublished and updated version of the same manuscript.
Table 1.The Current Account and Trade in Sheltered Services (NA









Gross figures for shipping
	
26599	 42906
Gross figures for oil drilling	 1522	 1667
Other oil related services
	
6867	 669



































Post and telecommunication	 1774	 1411






Dwelling services	 0	 0
Trade in sheltered activities as
percent of total service trade
	
21.3	 24.1





Most services are not specified in the CA, but sort
under the residual category other services. The NA may
provide us with more disaggregate trade figures. The
so-called sheltered services in the NA approximately
correspond to other services in the CA6 . As mentioned
earlier, these service industries are also traditionally
represented as naturally sheltered in most Norwegian
macroeconomic models. Summing up over these
industries, their exports and imports in 1992
represented 6.6 and 7.3 percent, respectively, of total
registered trade in the CA.
6 It is important to notice that due to a recent revision of the NA
figures, the disaggregate NA figures in Table 1 does not correspond
perfectly with the more aggregate CA numbers, which are unrevised.
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The figures from the CA show that total import and
total export of services almost balanced in 1992. While
the large Norwegian shipping fleet generated a
considerable trade surplus, the extensive oil activity in
the North sea contributed considerably in the other
direction. So did travelling services. Norwegians seem
to travel relatively much, and imports of travelling
services were twice as large as exports. Trade in other
services is rather balanced. By looking at its sub-
categories by means of the NA, one can observe that
imports and exports of domestic transport services,
finance and insurance services and other private
services constitute the dominant part of trade in this
category.
4.3. Trade at a more disaggregate level
The NA provides figures on the so-called sheltered
services at an even finer level of aggregation. In Table
2, production and trade figures for these finest service
groups are listed for the years 1992, 1993 and 1994,
provided some trade is registered. The figures are
commented on below, under headings referring to the
more aggregate sheltered service categories of the NA
(see Table 1). Emphasis is put on trying to identify the
type of trade performed - according to the typography
in Chapter 3. At this most disaggregate NA level, such a
categorisation appears to be meaningful, as the
characteristics of the services within each group are
relatively homogenous. Be aware that for the industries
characterised by competition through foreign
investments in Norway or Norwegian direct
investments abroad (type 4 trade), the import and
export figures underestimate the amount of trade. The
type and the amount of trade performed is of course
not only dependant on the natural attributes of the
particular services. Commercial policy and trade
barriers have traditionally regulated most service
activities and can explain much of the trade patterns
revealed in Table 2. We refer to Section 6.5 below,
where a detailed presentation of the policy regimes is
given.
Tourism is registred as foreigners' consumption in
Norway, and included in the aggregate export figures.
NA does, however, not provide disaggregate figures on
these consumption activities. Nevertheless, based on
the NA tourist accounts documented by Trude Nygård
(1996), we have been able to present estimates of
foreigners' consumption on the most disaggregated NA
level (See the column labelled Additional consumption
in Table 2) . Unfortunately, there exist no such dis-
aggregated estimates for Norwegian tourists' consump-
tion abroad, hence there is no corresponding column
that represents such import activities in Table 2.
4.3.1. Construction services
According to Table 2, most of the value of trade in
construction services was related to exports of road
and airport construction and to a lesser extent of
building construction. Services like craftsmanship,
plumbing and electrical installation require physical
proximity, implying that exports must take the form of
producers travelling abroad for a limited period (type 3
trade) . A significant part of the construction services
can also be encapsulated and sent abroad, like the
products provided by architects and engineers. In
Norway, construction activities are strongly dominated
by domestic producers, mainly due to the advantage of
being represented at the very location. As outlined in
Section 6.5, trade is little hampered by political
regulations.
4.3.2. Wholesale and retail trade
Exports and imports of wholesale and retail trade
services are only registered in the NA, whenever there
is an international payment due to provisions or
commissions in this industry. For instance, a
Norwegian agent representing a foreign firm in Norway
will export her services for a certain provision. This
way, all such trade is performed between parties
located in different countries and sorts under type 1
trade. Such international payments are strongly linked
to foreign direct investments (type 4 trade), another
important source of foreign competition, not reflected
in the figures. There is little reason to believe that
trade were significantly hampered by political trade
barriers.
4.3.3. Transport services
Domestic transport services encompasses the sub-
groups land transport, air transport, railroad transport,
domestic sea transport and post & telecommunication.
Further disaggregated in Table 2. In 1992, trade was
registered in 28 categories of the very finest NA level,
including everything from taxi services to satellite
transfers, as shown in Table 2.
Within land transport, export of cargo transport and
forwarding services dominates, both characterised by
producers travelling abroad (type 3 trade) . Trade
barriers have been gradually removed, but were
nevertheless highly prevalent in 1994. Passenger
transport in the form of type 3 trade (producer
mobility) is not registered in the years 1992 to 1994.
This is first of all explained by heavy trade regulations.
probably While some export of passenger transport
exists in the form of foreigners' consumption (type 2
export), the symmetric import is unfortunately not
registered in the figures. There is, however, reason to
believe that a more detailed specification of foreigners'
consumption in Norway would reveal that imports in
the form of type 2 also existed.
Most of the traded air transport services are related to
passenger flights. Export of these services occurs
whenever foreigners located in their home country
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purchase a ticket from a Norwegian airline or SAS. In
addition, tourist consumption by foreigners is also
registered, hence, trade in these services are
characterised both by type 2 and 3. Apparently, the air
transport industry was one of the most open service
industries in Norway during the period from 1992 to
1994, when measured in terms of trade relative to
gross production, and the industry is becoming
increasingly exposed to foreign competitors.
Passenger transport also dominates the railroad
services. Export is registered through purchased tickets
from abroad and through consumption by foreign
tourists, both implying travelling by consumers - i.e.
type 2 export. Import is only registered when
Norwegians purchase tickets at home for travels
abroad, but there is reason to believe that import also
occur in the form of Norwegians' consumption abroad.
While type 2 trade is not significantly regulated, type 3
trade is almost non-existing, partly due to protections.
Table 2. Production and Trade in Services (statistics on the most disaggregated National Account level)- Million NOK












452110 Building construction 24311 26 113 22226 90 61 27126 48 40
452300 Road and airport
construction
6474 83 305 7667 61 117 7997 64 475
452500 Other construction 5760 0 39 11726 0 8 12577 0 60
Wholesale and retail trade -
510900 Provisions &
commisions
2977 965 1059 2431 1193 1122 2641 1398 1147
Air transportation
621010 Passenger flights 8776 797 1928 200 9396 1310 1165 268 9941 1096 1590
621022 Cargo flights 537 0 225 743 0 291 710 0 277
622030 Foreign flights w/ man 522 233 278 796 370 338
632310 Air services 1652 0 76 1790 0 68
Domestic sea transportation
611011 	 Short distance traffic 626 70 74
611012 Long distance traffic 261 126 149
611028 Car ferry services 827 56 59
631110 Loading activities 1497 0 132 2135 0 143 2327 0 174
632211 	 Port authorities 546 0 165 630 0 163 672 0 197
632215 Other sea services 2206 0 1323 1915 0 1344 1162 0 1037
634011 Ship brooking 1884 327 344 2204 497 508 2615 406 622
Land transportation etc.
602123 City bus transport 3430 72 78
602130 Intercity bus transport 459 31 35
602210 Taxi and limo services 2896 94 94
602310 Bus & car services 1111 5 12 1233 5 8 1363 9 50
602410 Cargo & land transport 1213 0 268 1049 0 227 1127 0 307
631210 Storage 554 0 55 560 0 61 610 0 73
632110 Railroad services 0 65 0
634012 Forwarding services 400 0 309 442 326 1121 0 998




1384 322 249 1456 184 205 256 1625 149 152
601021 	 Railroad cargo
transport
1050 0 172 996 0 123 1026 0 179
602110 Local railroad transport 477 12 12
602124 Subways and tramcars 464 14
632110 Railroad services 0 65 102
' Additional export is export through foreigners' consumption in Norway. Statistics on the corresponding import through Norwegians' consumption abroad are not
available.
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Table 2. Continued











Post and telecommunication - - - - -
641115 International
transactions
299 150 299 - 336 174 336 289 141 289
642011 Telephone services 10934 1446 588 10715 1590 646 - 10877 858 446
642014 Telex og telegraph 110 146 32 - 97 161 37 70 85 24
642016 Electronic transferes 918 16 8 - 1515 18 9 - 1786 12 1
642023 Satelite transferee 845 0 307 - 1046 0 338 1085 0 251
642025 Other telecom. services 930 16 177 1395 - 195 - 1355 12 133
Banking and insurance - - - -
651212 Banking 6303 266 118 6849 382 92 6940 119 96
652212 Other credit services 1348 230 119 1568 299 165 - 1717 344 211
660110 Insurance services 3414 3 9 2397 2 25
660319 Damage insurance
services
4169 3684 3296 - 3677 3994 3553 - 5198 3943 3131
Other private services - -
551000 Hotel services 5980 - - 2240 - - 2499
552000 Other accomodation
services
821 - 373 - - 423
553000 Restaurant services 12548 - 2340 - - 2538
554000 Other restaurant
services
676 97 - 98
555000 Cantina & catering 3277 0 193 2978 0 224 - 3007 0 266
702012 Hous rent, businesses 15546 132 18 - 17889 190 34 - 18906 199 46
711010 Car rentals 332 - 76 - 88 -
712210 Ship and boat rentals 914 0 677 - 756 0 615 717 0 581
713411 	 Mashinery rents 1694 452 323 1685 867 417 1991 860 140
713412 	 Oilrig leasing 1113 0 846 - 1379 327 1331 1331 249 1330
722010 Computer services - - - - 743 124 - 0 829 107
722020 Software consulting 3920 587 212 - 4295 686 311 4831 744 447
731000 R&D, natural sciences 2601 547 386 2475 506 487 - 2517 570 617
741110 Legal services 2518 424 229 2525 468 263 2461 603 338
741200 Accounting services - - 4807 26 2 5061 13 7
741400 Corporate consulting
etc.
3426 255 265 2851 328 94 - 2543 468 302
742011 Tecnical drawings - - 14 1 - 0 8 1
742020 Tecnical consulting 4383 781 481 - 3943 940 471 4107 1231 724
742040 Other technical services 10896 0 138 - 12241 0 241 14116 0 188
744010 Commersials & ads 7193 192 154 8264 190 206 - 9365 369 308
748110 Fotography services 0 47 15 - 45 7 0 31 7
748400 Other corporate
services
2592 4082 2685 2845 3821 3064 - 3809 3302 2357
748410 Patent & licence lease 0 1142 757 - 1888 891 0 2104 819
921110 Films 0 15 1 17 1 - 0 18 0
921120 Video casetts 0 80 9 - 69 142 20 79 143 34
921210 Film & videodistribution 36 99 56 - -
922002 TV-advertising services 1233 3 4 - -
923110 Art & antiques 2058 95 74 - - -
923122 Entertain & theatre 1927 40 11 -
923300 Amusement parks &
circus
739 - - 198 - 215
925000 Library and museum
services
474 - 28 - 37
926000 Tourist related sports 380 148 148
930400 Other personal services 240 12 22 - -
' Additional export is export through foreigners' consumption in Norway. Statistics on the corresponding import through Norwegians' consumption abroad are not
available.
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Due to the extensive international shipping activity, the
amount of trade in ship brooking services is quite
significant. Data on trade in post and telecommuni-
cation services show that trade in regular telephone
services represented more than half of the industry
trade and that there was a significant deficit in the
trade balance.
4.3.4. Banking and insurance services
According to the national accounting figures, trade in
banking and insurance services was primarily linked to
the international market for damage insurance. With
respect to banking, international loan and savings
activities dominate the external trade. Nilsen and
Sandal (1996) used the statistics on foreign assets and
liabilities to map the amount of foreign competition on
the Norwegian financial markets and found that out of
the total loan activity in 1994/1995, approximately 30
percent was directed towards foreign banks and
financial institutions. The authors found considerably
less foreign competition on the market for savings,
amounting to 7-10 percent during the last years. This
trade consist primarily of electronically transferred
services (Type 1 trade) . In addition, the number of
foreign subsidiaries and branches established in
Norway is increasing (see Section 6.5.) as market
access has been liberalised. this type of trade (type 4)
not registered in the Table 2 figures.
4.3.5. Other private services
Other private services is the largest category with
respect to trade. The bulk of activities named other
corporate services represents a dominating part of the
industry trade, however, this is by all means a residual
sub-category that basically contains all corporate
services except for corporate, technical, legal and
software consulting. The figures in Table 2 show that
trade in all these services - which is usually performed
as type 1 and 3 trade - was relatively large. Trade in
hotel and restaurant services, which are almost ex-
clusively type 2 trade, is uniquely linked to foreigners'
consumption in Norway. Hence, we have no estimates
regarding imports of such services. However, if we
assume that the amount of imports relative to exports
of restaurant and hotel services is proportional to the
amount of imports relative to exports of travelling
services in the CA, reported in Table 1, these categories
will apparently also play a dominating role in the trade
of other private services. Finally, it is necessary to be
aware of the considerable amount of rental and leasing
activities that sort under this service industry. Inter-
national leasing of patents and licenses represent the
most traded activity and does not require that agents
travel to meet, as the service can be performed through
contractual arrangements that are electronically
intermediated (i.e. type 1 trade).
4.3.6. Dwelling services
There was not registered any trade in dwelling services
in 1992. The category mostly contains house letting
services, but real estate administration and mediation
is also included here. The NA tourist accounts have
until now not been able to produce reliable data on
these activities. Producers in these markets have
traditionally been strongly dependent on local
knowledge and reputation, hence, the industry has
been regarded as almost completely sheltered from
foreign competition. In the recent years, however, the
environment for such services have grown more
international. Trade must obviously rest on type 3 and
4 trade.
4.4. A discussion on the tradability of services
The services listed in Table 2 represent all disaggregate
groups subject to registered trade in 1992. Their gross
production constituted 28 percent of total sheltered
service gross production registered in NA. The
remaining disaggregate service groups, which are
excluded from Table 2, had no registered trade. In
Table 3, the corresponding percentage proportions
within each NA sheltered service group i reported'.

































The figures reveal that most of the service industries
categorised as naturally sheltered in the NA, as well as
in most macroeconomic models of Norway, are quite
heterogeneous with respect to occurrence of registered
trade. It appears to be quite unsatisfactory to treat all
the aggregates as non-tradables. Trade is registered in
the majority of the transport and communication
service activities, as well as in substantial parts of the
construction and other private service activities.
As pointed out, two important types of trade,
Norwegians' purchases abroad (type 2 trade) and most
of the foreign direct investments (type 4 trade), are not
included in the figures. With a more complete
registration, the tradable part of the service industries
would increase. In addition, services can of course be
tradable without actually being traded. Chapter 5
below discusses the relevance of threat of competition,
while Chapter 6 is devoted to political barriers to entry
and trade. Thus, Table 3 undoubtedly presents a rather
conservative picture of the tradability of services.
7 The proportions result from adding together gross production for
all disaggregate activities where trade is registered and calculating
their percentage share of sector gross production.
15
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5. Natural barriers to entry and trade in
service markets
Typically, the competitive structures in service markets
deviate considerably from perfect competition, largely
due to the particular characteristics of services. Barriers
to entry and trade restrict domestic as well as
international competition. The present section presents
natural barriers to trade in the service markets, while
the next section studies hindrances that are political in
nature.
Natural barriers to market entry may take on two
forms. They may prevent (potential) competition from
new establishers in a market, or they may hinder
transaction of services from one location to a market in
another location. We will denote the two groups
establishment and transaction barriers, respectively.
Natural establishment barriers
Establishment barriers result in some kind of imperfect-
ly competitive industrial organisation. Sapir (1991)
stresses two characteristic features of services that may
lead to imperfect competition. First, the scope for
differentiating between services both in quality and
location is likely to develop monopolistic competition,
where producers of different varieties of a service
obtain some market power (see e.g. Flam and Helpman
(1987) for a formal discussion of such competition).
Second, fixed costs is present in production, e.g.
conditioned on infrastructure as for railroad and
telecommunication services. These may give rise to
scale economies and/or scope economies, which will
limit the competition due to natural monopoly power.
However, the theory of contestable markets, developed
by Baumol et al. (1988), points out that fixed costs
need not provide cost advantages to market in-
cumbents. As long as investments in real estate,
equipment etc. can be resold, entrants represent a
potential threat and markets are contestable so that
average cost pricing is ensured. Sunk costs will however
represent an entry barrier. Such costs are often
associated with the intangible nature of services, which
makes investments in reputation and confidence
essential. In addition, even tangible capital in the
service industries - such as premises and transport
equipment - may give rise to market power, even if it
has multiple uses and may be rented. That is so, if
incumbents are able to promptly and flexibly change
the prices or quality of their supply, in a way that turn
entrance unattractive. Such strategic barriers to entry
were e.g. found by Baumol and Willig (1986) in the
case of airlines.
Sapir (1991) concludes by dividing services into three
main classes with respect to natural market structure.
The first structure is related to differentiation in
consumption, while the last two are consequences of
increasing returns to scale and incontestability. Sapir
argues that the majority falls into (a) :
a) monopolistic competition
Examples: business and trade, professional services,
tourism, consulting, entertainment.
b) natural monopolies
Examples: Telecommunications, Railroads, Water
supply, Distribution of electricity
c) natural oligopolies
Examples: Financial services, Airlines
Natural transaction barriers
Transaction barriers are factors that make it costly to
transfer a service from the supplier to the consumer,
either by moving the service, the producer or the
consumer. We characterise technological and cultural
transaction costs as natural transaction barriers.
Cultural transaction barriers refer to factors affecting
the interaction and communication between producers
and consumers, like language, customs and tradition.
Natural trade barriers
Establishment barriers or transaction barriers that
hinder competition from foreigners may, in line with
the definition of trade in section 3.2, be denoted trade
barriers. Natural barriers that hinder transaction from a
foreign enterprise to a domestic consumer, either by
reducing the mobility of the producer, the consumer or
the (encapsulated) service are the most common kind
of trade barriers. Natural establishment barriers may
however also prevent trade. This mainly applies to
international competition from foreign direct invest-
ments, which is included in our trade concept. In order
to regard foreign direct investments as foreign
16
Reports 97/18	 Policy, Trade and Competition in Service Industries
competition, there should be some kind of sunk costs
inherent in the capital or entrepreneurship of the
foreign establisher, that bring a particularly efficient
input or technology into the market. A foreign investor
using only domestic technology and inputs', is not
really interesting to distinguish from domestic
entrants 9 .
All kinds of natural trade barriers mentioned may be
prohibitive, i.e. they involve costs of establishing
and/or transacting that exceed the difference between
the price realised on the domestic market in absence of
trade and the lowest possible price of an equal foreign
service. An industry producing such non-tradable
services is characterised as naturally sheltered. In total
absence of foreign competition (trade), markets may
still be domestically competitive. As concluded above,
establishment barriers are however common in markets
for non-traded services1o .
To sum up, natural barriers to competition mainly fall
into the classification presented in Table 4 below.
Domestic competition as well as trade in the form of
foreign direct investments are predominantly hindered
by natural establishment barriers like scale economies
or product heterogeneity. Other kinds of foreign
competition are usually subject to natural transaction
barriers (technological or cultural in character) .
8 or inputs and technology that equally easy could be achieved by
domestic producers
9 Another kind of establishment barrier hindering trade may occur if
a domestic firm possess market power in a global sense. Thus
establishments in any country is hindered.
10 Transaction costs within a country may also be of some
significance.
17
Policy, Trade and Competition in Service Industries 	 Reports 97/18
6. Political barriers to entry and trade in
service markets
6.1. Government regulations vs. protection
Policy instruments directed towards service markets
are to a large extent analogous to those applied to
manufacturing industries, such as taxes, subsidies and
protection. The particularities of the service markets
have, however, given rise to other types of regulative
arrangements like various obligations, prohibitions and
surveillance measures imposed on market participants
and entrants. We reserve the concept regulations to
political instruments other than taxes, subsidies and
trade regulations, which affect the structure, prices and
quantity produced in a market. By also excluding trade
regulating measures, regulations will exclusively affect
domestic competition in sheltered markets', see Table
4. If regulative measures serve to protect domestic
firms from foreign competition, they will be defined as
protection or political trade barriers (see below) .
Protection or political barriers to trade can be defined
as all government measures that have the effect of
increasing the domestic price above the price of a
potential foreign competitor (included natural
establishment and transaction costs) . In line with the
delimitation of natural trade barriers, protection usually
takes on the form of a politically imposed transaction
costs. Establishment regulation may also be of
significance, especially in case of (potential)
competition from foreign establishers in the home
market. If a protection measure prohibits all potential
trade, or if the measure is formulated in terms of
quantity restrictions, the service producer is
characterised as politically sheltered.
Measures designed to regulate domestic markets may
also function as political barriers to international trade.
This is so if they have the effect of discriminating
against foreign producers, i.e. foreigners who are able
to supply domestic markets at lower prices are ruled
out. In our framework, these measures are defined as
protection, even if the regulation also exclude potential
domestic producers (possibly with even lower prices
than the foreigners) . Typically, previous regulations
imposed by a national government in markets for non-
11 This applies to both naturally and politically sheltered markets.
tradable services have gradually turned to become
protection, as the natural barriers to trade have
diminished in pace with the technological development.
6.2. Rationales for regulations and protection
The rationales for regulating a service market are often
related to the particularities of services, which may
result in several characteristic market failures in
unregulated markets. Other motives are rooted in
concern of welfare in a wider sense. Influence of
particular interest groups is also an important factor.
Below we list some typical welfare arguments in more
detail (see e.g. Noll 1989):
Failure of competition. In incontestable service markets
natural monopolies and oligopolies might evolve,
giving rise to market power abuse. Fixed costs are
prevalent in several of the heavy infrastructure-
dependant service industries (telecommunication,
railroads), as well as in industries heavily relying on
reputation (research, consulting, education).
Destructive competition is another kind of competition
failure especially relevant for the service sector. In
markets with differentiated products, there exists an
inherent information problem. In case of relatively few
agents, strong price competition may thus deteriorate
the quality of the products. Frequent bankruptcies and
thus uncertain deliveries can also be interpreted as a
quality reduction.
Asymmetric information. Even if the conditions for
destructive competition is not present, asymmetric
information related to the intangible and differentiated
nature of services represents a market failure potential.
This also applies to the monopolistically competitive
service markets. Information on quality is costly and
often unobtainable in advance of consumption and
may thus create moral hazard and adverse selection
problems.
Externalities. Positive externalities may be an argument
for promoting certain kinds of service production.
Research and development as well as education and
training are traditional examples. Communication








x^^^::::::^:, •^:{<, »> : : : : : : : .: : : :: .:; V:^; ::;:,::^:...^._.,... •:^:å;,::r.^.Y:'•.^:^:^:=;i^::»;:,:'^::::^•...._ .
Reports 97/18
	
Policy, Trade and Competition in Service Industries
Table 4
their network. Regulations may also be used to ensure
branch confidence, as adverse selection may cause
negative externalities to the whole branch. Let the yet
unregulated internet services serve as an example.
Public goods. Many services are public goods that
cannot be provided in socially desired quantities, unless
regulated or produced publicly. Obvious examples are
police and defence services, which are typically
provided by the government. Arguments to regulate
provision of certain services in respect to morality
(religious activities, entertainment, press etc.), national
identity (cultural activities), security, independence
etc., are also based on certain aspects of the services
having a public good character.
Distribution. In order to attain distributional objectives,
concession rights may e.g. be attached with certain
requirements concerning coverage of geographical or
social segments of the economy (e.g. air traffic and
health care) . Alternatively, the government may choose
to produce basic services on its own, to ensure
sufficient justice (education, health and social care,
cultural activities) .
Merit goods. Merit goods are goods which are not
chosen by the consumers in sufficient quantities from
the viewpoint of the government. For paternalistic
reasons, regulations may be introduced in order to
provide (and compel to consume) certain amounts of
merit goods. Examples are compulsory basic education
or obligatory security tests of vehicles.
Other macroeconomic purposes. As for industries in
general, industrial policies towards service production
may be motivated by other macroeconomic policy
aims, like stabilisation or employment.
6.3. Common regulation measures
Concession requirements provide the government with
control over the market structure as well as the identity
or special characteristics of the agents. Several of the
above mentioned motives may underlie such an
intervention; prevention of destructive competition is
one frequently used argument in e.g. the airline,
shipping, trucking and banking markets. Specified
conditions are usually attached to the concession
rights, concerning characteristics of the service
products, market coverage, ownership structure, etc.
Examples are air lines required to cover specified
geographical segments of a market, or medical
institutes restricted to certain fields of activity.
Price control is a usual intervention in monopolistic or
oligopolistic markets, to avoid abuse of market power.
Due to the problem of detecting true average costs, the
regulation is often formulated in terms of the
development rather than the level of prices, for instance
in accordance with some price index. Alternatively,
firms may be subject to price surveillance, in which
case the threat of potential intervention is to have a
controlling effect.
Occupational licensing and certification is designed to
assure less asymmetry in information between
consumers and producers. This restricts the potential
for moral hazard and adverse selection, and reduces
reputational externalities within an occupational
group. Licensing and certification is often required to
provide services e.g. as doctors, lawyers, real estate
agents and accountants.
Governmental procurement policies that favour certain
suppliers may serve to regulate the structure of the
market, provided the government is a significant
consumer.
Regulations of advertising and marketing are first of all
provided through general acts of law, applying to all
economic activity. Due to the asymmetric information
problem in service markets, they may be of special
importance to services. Some services are subject to
particular advertising or marketing rules, specifically
formulated in order to increase the informational
value, e.g. the obligation to publish the effective interest
rate of loans.
General Acts regulating economic activity, for example
the process of entering and exiting a market, are
intended to stabilise the markets and thus restrict
destructive competition. Depending on the complexity
of the rules, they may increase sunk costs, and thus
increase entry barriers.
Governmental provision may in principle provide full
control of the supply side of the market. Supply by
local or central governments is often rationalised by
arguments of severe and complex deviation between
the socially preferred outcome and market outcomes.
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6.4. Common protection measures
Protection measures against foreign competition in
services do to some extent resemble trade barriers
applied to importable goods. Compared to goods,
however, tariffs are less adequate, though applied to
certain encapsulated services like movies and computer
software. Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) of various kinds
are much more prevalent.
Below we list common policy measures that restrain
international competition. According to the mentioned
types of potential foreign competition, NTBs may
represent hindrances related to the four types of trade:
1) the mobility of services, 2) the mobility of recipients,
3) the mobility of suppliers or 4) possibilities for
foreign establishments. Finally, some measures may in
general restrict competition.
Mobility of services (type 1 trade) has become
technologically feasible for many services.
Nevertheless, political trade restrictions are present.
Procurement practice (primarily by central or local
governments) which favours local suppliers, either by
requiring fixed local shares or by accepting price gaps
within certain limits. Also, quality or qualification
standards may exclude foreign competitors.
Restrictions on data mobility across borders or on
loans/deposits in foreign financial institutions are other
examples.
Mobility of recipients (type 2 trade) include mobility of
persons as well as objects. Migration and visa
regulations control such movement across borders.
Insurance refunding is critical in case of medical
services, while access to repairing services abroad may
be complicated by certification requirements (on cars,
machinery etc.) .
Mobility of suppliers or foreign establishments (type 3
and 4 trade) may be reduced by rules affecting factor
mobility or costs/availability of domestic factors.
Capital mobility may be restricted by inter alia
concession requirements, stock share restrictions or
restrictions on international transfers of surpluses.
Labour mobility is contingent upon working permits, as
well as specific requirements concerning licensing and
qualifications. Other inputs may also be restricted, e.g.
data mobility across borders or access to infrastructure
networks in the host country. Discriminatory
tax/subsidy policies by the domestic government may
favour national suppliers'.
General constraints on competition are rules or practices
which in principle may restrain all the above
mentioned mobility aspects. Acts restricting activities of
12 Also differences in subsidy levels among competitors of different
nationalities, would function as trade barriers, to the extent that
subsidy differences are reflected in prices. In HOS models, this
possibility is ruled out.
advertising and marketing may work to favour
incumbent firms, thus also protecting against imports.
Strict rules on currency exchange may hinder all kinds
of service transfer. Finally, there may exist bilateral
arrangements that work to rule out the most efficient
provision of imported services.
6.5. Regulation and protection of the
Norwegian service industries
6.5.1. Construction services'
Supply of construction services has not been regulated
in Norway, except that formal qualifications are
required for certain services. Building regulations,
technical standards on building material, and technical
requirements preconditioning credit subsidies in
housing, have been potential obstacles to entry, in
particular for foreign companies. So has the procure-
ment practice of the public sector, though no formal
restrictions have existed. As foreign competition
requires mobility of supply or establishment, restrictive
rules on use of foreign labour and foreign ownership
have inhibited imports of construction services. The
Nordic market for labour has, however, been open.
The EEA treaty requires that central and local govern-
ments, public service institutions, and activities with
exclusive concession rights, practice open tender
procedures in their procurement of construction works,
provided the value of the works amounts to more than
5 mill. ECU. The tender is to be announced in a
domestic official publication (Norsk utlysningsblad), as
well as in the Official Journal of the European
Communities and the database Tenders Electronic Daily.
The information required in the announcement is
specified. The result of the tender evaluation is also to
be announced. Appealing procedures are established.
Within the EEA, qualification diplomas are mutually
recognised, thereby a former technical trade barrier is
removed. As supply of materials usually constitutes an
integrated part of the bids, also trade barriers on
intermediates have represented a disadvantage for
foreign constructors. With the EEA treaty, minimum
standards on building materials are harmonised. In
addition, the competition rules forbid market sharing
by European cement producers, a collusion which has
previously effectively prohibited trade in cement
products.
No restrictions on labour mobility remain within EEA.
By undertaking a job in another country, one are
however subject to the county's legislation concerning
working conditions and wages.
13 Sources: ECON (1993), European Free Trade Association (1994),
St.prp. nr. 100 (1991-92), and St.prp. nr. 65 (1993-94).
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In association with the Uruguay negotiations, parallel
plurilateral negotiations took place on government
procurement practices. The Norwegian offer goes no
further than the commitments in the EEA Agreement,
but more nations are involved. USA, Canada, Japan,
Hong Kong, Korea, and Israel have entered bilateral
agreements with Norway, in addition to EU. The
agreements came into force by 1. of January 1996.
6.5.2. Wholesale and retail trade"
The wholesale and retail trade sector is strongly
affected by particular national characteristics, such as
geographical distance and population density, two
variables that make Norway a different case compared
to central European countries. During the last 10 years,
several parts of the distribution system has been
strongly liberalised and restructured. The most
important change is probably the restructuring of the
grocery trade sector. The establishment of few, but
large, food store chains has contributed to large
reductions in food prices.
The EPA treaty opens for free competition among
wholesale and retail trade firms from the rest of
Europe. However, the increasing vertical market power
of large Norwegian trading companies works as an
obstacle to new entrants in the trading system, facing
limited possibilities for efficient supply and support
services. The treaty has also contributed to a more
liberalised drug store system, where medical drugs
equipment is presently distributed by several
companies. Drug stores are increasingly encouraged to
compete on prices and goods selection, although
authorisation is needed to provide medical distribution
services. The distribution of wine is also liberalised, as
imports and wholesale trade is privatised and an
increasing number of state owned wine stores are
established. During the coming months, a series of
important cases regarding the existing wine sales
monopoly, will be tested in the EPA court. If the saying
goes against the Norwegian government, it is likely that
also sales of wine and liquor will be privatised and
open for international competition.
Finally, the book store sector has been offered selective
measures to maintain the high number of stores
located in the districts. The measures include fixed
prices and limited ability to sell books and paper goods
outside the book stores. Lately, the market participants
have found reason to cancel these regulations, and the
publishing market could now become significantly
deregulated.
14 Sources: European Free Trade Association (1994).
6.5.3. Transport and communication services
Air transport15
In 1994, Norway joined EU's third aviation package
through the EPA membership, which is designed to
liberalise the European market for air transport. The
package or treaty has been gradually implemented and
was fully established on April 1. 1997. As a member of
the treaty, Norwegian authorities can no longer grant
flight and landing licences, since this has become an EU
matter. The package allows all EU commuter airline to
operate on any international route within the EU. On
domestic routes with less than 30 000 seats per year,
the government may regulate the market in order to
sustain airline services or avoid unhealthy competition.
Airlines are allowed to set prices freely, but the
authorities may regulate the number of airport destina-
tions in accordance with airport capacity due to safety
concerns. The treaty does not solve third country
questions, and the Norwegian government is still
practising heavy licensing regulations on routes de-
stined for airports outside the EU. One example is the
airline Braathen, which is not allowed to carry pass-
! engers to the Baltic countries where SAS is the only
licence holder. Also, the EU has not found a permanent
way to resolve the question of government aid, which
has been offered through the EU system in several
cases after 1994, e.g. to Air France, Iberia and Sabena.
As predicted by e.g. Norman and Strandenes (1994),
the liberalisation has brought forward significant price
cuts of up to 20 percent on the most popular routs. In
addition, new low-price-low-service airliners from
abroad are planning to open new links between
Norway and large European cities, cutting the previous
prices in half. Free price setting has also contributed to
price hikes on the less popular routes e.g. in Northern
Norway, where air fares are now significantly more
expensive compared to some years earlier.
Sea transport16
90 percent of the Norwegian fleet (including
Norwegian ships under flag of convenience) is engaged
in overseas trade. International shipping is subject to
fairly free access, regardless of place of registration.
Norway has two ship registers. The Norwegian
Ordinary Register (NOR) encompasses ships servicing
the Norwegian coast and continental shelf. In order to
attain registration, at least 60% of the capital must be
Norwegian, and the majority of the members of the
board must be Norwegian nationals. The ship-owning
company must be headquartered in Norway. In 1987
the Norwegian International Ship Register (NIS) was
established, to increase competitiveness of Norwegian
registered ships in overseas trade. Conditions for
15 Sources: European Free Trade Association (1994), Norman and
Strandenes (1994), Træen (1994) and World Trade Organisation
(1996).
16 Sources: St.meld. nr. 32 (1995-96), St.prp. nr. 65 (1993-94),
St.meld. nr. 28 (1995-96) and World Trade Organisation (1996).
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registration in NIS are less restrictive; foreign ships
may enter as long as the owner company has
headquarters or representatives in Norway. NIS ships
are excluded from internal coastal traffic.
Some protective restrictions still exist within
international liner trade (i.e. regular freight traffic
between two or more ports), where the nations
involved enjoy preferences. Most countries restrict
access to internal routes. Monopolised rights and
admittance to price collaboration are common
regulatory means and subsidies are widespread.
Norway practices open market access to domestic
freight transport. (Only NIS ships are excluded.)
Passenger transport is mostly regulated by concession
rules. Considerations have traditionally been taken to
protect incumbents. Førsund (1991) applied Data
Envelopment Analysis to measure the efficiency among
providers of domestic ferry services. He found a high
degree of inefficiency, that might arise from the exten-
sive use of government regulation. New rules in force
from 1994 open for tender procedures in allocation of
routes. Also, subsidies are to a less extent given as
deficiency contribution, and more as unrestrained
grants, to encourage efficient management. Price and
market sharing collaboration is illegal, but some
exemptions are granted by the Norwegian competition
authorities, Konkurransetilsynet, in order to maintain
liner services on particular routes.
The International Maritime Organisation, IMO,
provides international legislation on security and
environmental issues. International co-operation is
formalised within the frameworks of OECD, EEA and
WTO. The EEA agreement implies Norwegian partici-
pation in the common shipping policy of EU, with
exception from the common access rules to coastal
freight transport. Neither market access, subsidy policy,
nor regulatory practice were significantly affected by
the implementation of EEA. In the Uruguay round
negotiations, free liner transport and equal access to
auxiliary services in the ports were important issues of
concern. No conclusions were however reached, and
shipping was temporarily excluded from GATS. The
participants are committed to further negotiations.
Land transport s'
As opposed to international sea transport, land tran-
sport across borders is still regulated. Until the end of
the 80ses, cargo transport between Norway and a
second country was organised by bilateral arrange-
ments. The traffic permits were usually equally
distributed between the two nations, and hauliers from
third countries were excluded. From 1990, multilateral
quota agreements were introduced within EFTA. In
17 Sources: European Free Trade Association (1994), St.meld. nr. 32
(1995-96), and St.prp. nr. 100 (1991-92).
1993, traffic between EFTA countries was opened for
all operators from EFTA.
The domestic markets for cargo transport were far
more protected. In the 80s, entrance into the
Norwegian haulage markets required a concession
grant based on a needs test. In the nineties, a traffic
permit, ensuring professional conduct and financial
solidity, became sufficient for haulage activity. Techni-
cal requirements remained as a barrier to foreign
establishments. Until 1993, cabotage (= domestic
transport performed by non-resident carriers) was not
allowed in Norway, as in the other EU and EFTA
countries. In 1993, a quota system was introduced
within the Nordic countries. From autumn 1994, the
EU rules on cargo transport were implemented as a
part of the EEA agreement. This implied almost free
access to bilateral traffic within the Area. Norway
joined the EU cabotage quota system, implying
restricted cabotage rights in EU countries, and vice
versa. The EU legislation on harmonised technical,
safety and environmental standards came into force,
improving conditions for establishment in other EEA
countries.
The markets for passenger transport are far less
liberalised than the markets for cargo transport. In
1982, Norway signed an international agreement
allowing occasional cross-border bus trips of closed
groups or picking up passengers of your own nation-
ality abroad for return to your country of origin. With
the EEA agreement, Norwegian rules concerning more
regular bus transport to and from one or few destinies
within Norway, have been harmonised with those of
EU. The rules still open for needs tests. Domestic
passenger transport by road in regular routes requires a
concession from the state. In such considerations,
protection of the railroad traffic or already established
bus companies is an important element. Most routes
are monopolised and subject to price regulation.
Though some harmonisation of the concession practice
follows from the EEA treaty, needs tests are still
allowed. In 1994, new rules opened for tender
procedures in the allotment of concessions. To avoid
such competition, an alternative practice has become
common; the incumbent bus companies and the local
governments agree on cost and subsidy reductions.
While subsidies were previously given to balance
deficiencies, fixed grants have become more common.
Taxi transport is also regulated by needs tests to control
the supply. Taxis are associated to a local taxi central,
which has geographically limited monopoly. Fares are
regulated. Other passenger transport on a non-regular
basis is open for all companies with authorisation.
Ownership to the rail infrastructure on the one hand,
and the rights to transport by railroads on the other,
are organised in separated state companies. Norwegian
rules open for companies to apply for constructing new
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railroads or for hiring infrastructure from the state
company, NSB, and to operate private transport
services. New directions define parts of the subsidies to
the transport services as remuneration for public
services. With these last years adjustments of the
railway system, the EEA treaty does not imply any
further changes.
Post and telecommunication'
The EEA treaty, as well as the WTO, have contributed
to a considerable liberalisation of the Norwegian
market for telecommunication. Within 1998, the
market for telecom infrastructure services and voice
telephony is supposed to be open for free competition,
and today, more than 20 foreign telecommunication
operators provide services in Norway. The market for
telecom technology, terminals and internal networks
was liberalised in 1988 and digital mobile communi-
cation services were opened for free competition in
1990. The largest and previously state owned telecom
company Telenor is still granted monopoly position in
the market for public voice telephone services and the
provision of telecommunication networks. Hence,
Telenor has the unique position of being the only
company that can lease out lines, but the leasing prices
will be supervised by the Norwegian competition
authorities.
Although Norwegian telecom service prices are among
the lowest in Europe, prices in other Nordic countries
(especially Sweden) are even lower. As a consequence,
The entry of Swedish competitors may drive the prices
further down on most telecommunication services. The
WTO countries has recently agreed upon a treaty on
trade in services, which opens for extensive deregula-
tion of the global telecom market. This means that
American telecom companies get better access to
European markets where prices have traditionally been
significantly higher (especially on international
services) .
The Norwegian post system has traditionally been run
by a state monopoly, but is now partly liberalised due
to the EEA and WTO treaties. During the last years,
business mail servicing and different kinds of express
mailing is opened for foreign competition, however,
regular mailing services are still only provided by the
public post system. The EPA treaty allows the member
states to maintain a post monopoly to ensure a nation
wide distribution network, but the EU is now
considering changes in the regulation of post services
to increase competition further.
6.5.4. Banking and insurance services 19
Financial activities have traditionally been strongly
regulated in Norway. According to Berg et al. (1993),
in 1990 the Swedish commercial banks were found to
be at least 30 percent more efficient than the
Norwegian ones, a fact that may partly be explained by
the relatively strict regulation regime of Norway.
Nevertheless, since the mid 80s, substantial liberalisa-
tion efforts have taken place. This development is
closely linked to new technological possibilities for
cross-border movement of financial services and the
internationalisation of commerce and industry. From
1984, liberalised rules and procedures for cross-border
mobility of capital were implemented, along with
several deregulations of the domestic credit market.
Credit rationing and regulation of interest rates were
abolished, and the legislation concerning different
types of banks and financial institutions were
harmonised, to ensure stronger competition in each
market segment. Opening up of new branches became
easier. Also, market access by foreigners were released,
first by allowing foreign subsidiaries to operate in
Norwegian markets, and in 1991 by allowing
establishment of branches 20 . The liberalisation called
for well-defined prudential standards and effective
supervision, conducted by Kredittilsynet (The Banking,
Insurance and Securities Commission) under the
Ministry of Finance.
The banking crisis of the late 80s and early 90s resulted
in capital injections from the state amounting to 30
billion NOK during the years 1989 to 1993. In addition,
assets in the three dominant commercial banks (Den
norske Bank, Kredittkassen and Fokus Bank) were
overtaken by the state, after depreciating previous
asset values to zero.
The EEA Treaty of January 1994 and its Additional
Package in force from July 1994, encompass the entire
legislation of EU concerning financial servicing, with
some exceptions concerning relation to third countries.
EEA institutions may establish, open branches or
provide services across borders without any separate
Norwegian authorisation, as long as the institution has
license within an EEA member state. Activity within
Norwegian borders must be notified to Kredittilsynet.
Prudential rules (concerning minimum solvency,
liquidity, ownership, foreign currencies, customer risk,
interests in other companies, guarantee funds,
accounting procedures etc.) have been harmonised.
According to Nilsen and Sandal (1996), foreign
establishments represented 4.3 percent of the total
loan activity by commercial banks in 1995.  
19 Sources: European Free Trade Association (1994), St.meld. nr. 39
(1993-94) and World Trade Organisation (1996).
20 A subsidiary (in Norwegian: datterselskap) is a more independent
unit with separate capital, while a branch (in Norwegian: filial)
relies on the capital of its parent company.
18 Sources: European Free Trade Association (1994) and World
Trade Organisation (1996) .
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Remaining institutional restrictions on entry and trade
are now mainly imposed on third countries. Establis-
hment or provision of services of a non-EEA financial
institution is not allowed, unless they have already
achieved authority in another EEA member state. In
the field of insurance, intermediation by an authorised
broker of services originating from a non-EEA
company, is allowed in marine and transport insurance,
offshore insurance and insurance of large companies.
After negotiations with the relevant third country,
Norway is entitled to grant concession for any financial
service activity. The other EEA contracting parties must
be consulted, if the minimum prudential requirements
in the EU directives are not fulfilled. Norwegian rules
require that the managers, as well as at least 50% of
the Board of Directors/Committee of Representatives,
must be EEA member state citizens. Rules restricting
foreign ownership were abolished in 1995. In the
General Agreement on Services, GATS, in force from
January 1996, Norway commits to "most favoured
nation" treatment of non-EEA countries, i.e.
discrimination among third countries is not allowed.
State ownership may represent a remaining obstacle to
entry. In the three dominant commercial banks, the
share of equities held by the state has been reduced
gradually. Nevertheless, the government has
announced a long run interest in some degree of
continued ownership in the two larger, founded on
national concerns. In addition, the state runs several
specialised banks on a permanent basis. These provide
credit for inter alia housing, education and regional
development. Their lending quotas and to some extent
interest rates, are yearly decided by the Parliament.
The state also administers the public pension schemes.
Private pension schemes represent a supplement and is
partly co-ordinated with the public services. Social
security services are state monopolised.
6.5.5. Other Private Services'
The omnibus category Other Private Services encom-
passes a variety of activities. (Those with registered
trade are listed in Table 2.) Only the industries, within
which we have found specific political regulations
functioning as entry or trade barriers, are treated in
this section. When comes to medical, social and
educational services, the majority are provided by the
government and thus not included in this category.
Also, all trade in such services are performed within
the public sector. Therefore, medical, social and
educational services are, as well, excluded from the
subsequent discussion, though comprehensive
regulations certainly exist.
21 Sources: European Free Trade Association (1994), St.meld. nr. 32
(1992-93), St.prp. nr. 100 (1991-92), Nesheim (1993) and World
Trade Organisation (1996).
Exercising professions in Norway (as lawyers, accoun-
tants, architects etc.) requires formal education, as well
as authorisation by the government. Similar require-
ments are common in other countries, though specifi-
cations may vary and thus represent obstacles for
providing the services abroad. The EEA treaty ensures
that authorisation in one of the countries is sufficient
for practising in any other EEA country, conditioned on
an application. When the profession requires country-
specific knowledge or when the syllabus deviates
substantially between the education in the two
countries, a test or a practice period may be demanded.
The hotel and restaurant industries are regulated by the
Hotel Act of 1983, which authorise the local govern-
ments to give licences. Specifications on classification
standards and on the manager's qualifications are
given. Also the acts regulating closing hours and
serving licences for alcoholic beverages, are of import-
ance for hotels and restaurants. Foreigners meet no
special market restrictions. The EEA treaty tightened
the rules concerning consumer protection. Fire safety
standards and tourist insurance were improved. Also,
hotel ratings and advertising rules were standardised.
Culture and media have traditionally been a field of
governmental concern. Until recently, the Norwegian
Broadcasting Co-operation (NRK), had monopoly on
public service broadcasting. Public support and licence
fees financed the activities; all advertising and sponsor-
ing were illegal. Since 1989, private companies have
been allowed to broadcast via satellite on Norwegian
territory. In 1991, the private television broadcasting
company TV 2 was granted concession based purely on
financing through advertisement. TV 2 began its broad-
casting in September 1992. Still, NRK is authorised to
collect fees. A private radio station, also financed by
advertisements, was granted concession in 1993. By
the time of the EEA negotiations, Norwegian regula-
tions on advertising essentially coincided with those of
EU. The major deviance applied to advertising of
alcoholic beverages. The result of the negotiations was
that EFTA countries gained the right to maintain
previous prohibitions.
Cultural and artistic production is promoted by several
national foundations, public remuneration arrange-
ments, scholarships and support schemes. To fulfil the
non-discrimination principle in the EEA treaty, certain
adjustments in the allotment criteria were necessary.
Criteria concerning language and place of residence are
still acceptable. EU Directives, as well as the WTO
Treaty on immaterial rights, affect cultural and media
products. The international treaties ensure minimum
protection of originators of design, performance and
work of art, and regulate sales, borrowing and hiring of
artistic products.
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7. Conclusions
This report evaluates the relevance of classifying
service industries as sheltered industries, as done in
several macro economic models. For this purpose a
substantial part of the paper is devoted to establishing
a conceptual framework for the study of services, and
their particular market structures and political
circumstances. This framework is linked to empirical
findings on trade and competition. On this basis we
conclude that several services should be reclassified as
tradables. However, the industrial organisation of
service industries is seldom competitive. Models of
service industries must account for monopolistic
competition between differentiated products, fixed
costs, as well as strong elements of governmental
regulations.
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Appendix
Application to the ERA model
An introduction to the ERA model22
This part is devoted to the applicability of the points
made above, to an applied price model used in
Statistics Norway for computing Effective Rates of
Assistance (EØ) 23 . ERA is a summary measure of how
taxes, subsidies, protection and other forms of
industrial policies affect unit factor income of an
industry. Policies may be imposed on commodities or
industries, while factor income is an industry concept.
The model framework used for ERA calculations thus
requires input-output tables which link industries to
commodity flows. The model specifies 41 commodities
and 24 private industries. Each commodity is a so-
called main commodity of one and only one industry. In
every industry there is constant returns to scale
technology and perfect competition. The commodities
are regarded as homogeneous. Thus in each market
prices of similar products will be the same and equal to
unit costs.
The direction of causality in the price/cost relation
differs, depending on the tradability of the main
commodities of the industry. The modelling is similar
to most models of small, open economies. For
industries producing non-tradables as main
commodities, prices of their commodities are
endogenous and adjust to changes in unit costs. These
industries are characterised as naturally sheltered. On
the other hand, prices of tradables not subject to any
trade barriers are determined outside the model by
exogenous world market prices and freight costs. Shifts
in unit costs of industries exposed to international
competition (exposed or competing industries) will have
the effect of altering factor income per unit, i.e. ERA
will change.
In presence of import barriers24, price determination
falls in either category, depending on the
characteristics of the barriers: If the trade policy
measure represents a fixed extra cost of importing, the
price determination resembles that of unprotected
tradables. In addition to foreign prices and freight
costs, the price is adjusted by a fixed cost margin
representing e.g. a tariff or another cost of penetrating
the market. Examples of penetrating costs may be
technical specifications that increase production costs
in the exporting country, or home preferences in
22 See Holmøy et al. (1993) and Fæhn et al. (1995) for thorough
presentations.
23 Fæhn et al. (1995) and Holmøy and Hægeland (1995) (in
English) report Norwegian ERA computations for 1989 and 1991,
and Fæhn and Hægeland (1996) report 1994 figures.
24 Export subsidies to industries producing exportables will have an
analogous effect, see e.g. Fæhn et al. (1995) chapter 2.
governmental procurement formulated as a fixed
acceptable price gap between the domestic and the
foreign tenders. Industries producing tradables
protected by penetration costs as main commodities,
will obtain ERA changes from changes in assistance. If,
on the other side, the import barriers totally prohibit
imports or allow imports of a fixed amount, only, the
price determination resembles that of non-tradables.
Industries producing potentially tradable main
commodities which are completely sheltered by
political measures (politically sheltered industries), will
by definition have ERAs equal to zero. Industrial
policies that shift costs will rather affect the producer
price of the main commodity.
Naturally or politically sheltered industries play a
potentially important role in the ERA calculations.
Though they by definition obtain no effective
assistance, the effects of their assistance are
transmitted to consumers of intermediates via input
prices. Hence, for a given input-output structure, these
measured input-output-corrected effects of assistance
hinge on the chosen division between exposed and
sheltered industries.
ERA calculations were originally suggested as a means
of indicating allocative effects of assistance. The
ranking of unit factor income changes due to assistance
will - in simple HOS models for small, open economies
- predict the qualitative reallocation of resources. In
presence of sheltered industries, this is however only
true for the input-output-adjusted resource allocation
(see Holmøy et al. (1993)) . The ERA model is not able
to predict relative changes in the sheltered sector, nor
is it able to split the direct resource use of an exposed
industry from the indirect resource-use via input from
sheltered industries. Thus in general, the indicative
ability of ERAs diminishes with the size of the sheltered
sector.
The classification in the ERA model correspond largely
to the division made in the inflation model PRIM of the
sixties (Aukrust (1971)). At present, the following
industries are modelled as sheltered, implicitly
assuming natural barriers to trade:
• Construction activities (bygge- og
anleggsvirksomhet),
• Wholesale and retail trade (varehandel)
• Air transport etc. (lufttransport m.v.)
• Domestic sea transport (innenriks sjøfart)
• Road transport etc. (landtransport m.v.)
• Railway transport (jernbane- og sporveistransport)
• Post and telecommunication (post og
telekommunikasjon)
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• Finance and insurance (bank- og
forsikringsvirksomhet)
• Other private services (andre private tjenester)
• Dwelling services (boligtjenester)
• Production of electricity (elektrisitetsproduksjon)
The public sector is excluded from the ERA model, as
activities, included value added, are assumed to be
directly determined by the government, rather than
indirectly affected by industrial policy. The shipping
industry is also deliberately excluded from the ERA
studies, based on the argument that it absorbs an
negligible amount of the scarce resources in the
economy, being primarily provided by foreign
produced capital goods and foreign labour. Hence,
there is reason to believe that the ERA results are not
significantly affected by omitting this industry. Services
related to oil production are excluded of similar
reasons.
Suggestions concerning implementation in
the ERA model
A new division between tradables and non-
tradables
The hitherto naturally sheltered service aggregates of
the ERA model correspond to the service groups listed
in Table 3. The Table shows the percentage of the gross
production value of the ERA service industries,
involved in some kind of registered trade in 1992. In
spite of the emphasised downward bias in the
proportion estimates (see Section 4.4), the figures
indicate that the service aggregates in the ERA model
are quite heterogeneous with respect to tradability.
Thus, it would not be satisfactory to treat the
aggregates as completely tradable or completely non-
tradable (in other words, to treat industries as
completely sheltered or exposed) . To maintain this
important aspect of heterogeneity, we suggest to split
each model industry into two quasi industries, one
exposed and one naturally sheltered. The size of each
quasi industry would be based on their proportion of
industry gross production value that is associated with
trade, see Table 3. The sub-industries would be quasi in
the sense that the aggregation level of the ERA model
is given with respect to all remaining information.
Therefore, they would have similar input-output
structures. This is of course a strong assumption.
Changes in factor rewards for the industry as a whole
would be a weighted average of the changes in the two
industries25 . Since dwelling services appear completely
without registered trade, we suggest to let this industry
remain naturally sheltered.
To obtain a successful revision of the ERA estimates,
we must provide data on NTB's directed towards
imports of such services. Section A.2.4 below
25 For more on this method, see Fæhn et al. (1995) Chapter 2.3 and
Appendix 2.
comments further on this task. If possible, it would be
valuable to differentiate the quasi industries with
respect to other kinds of information, e.g. their
respective net subsidy rates. As already pointed out in
chapter 6, information on industrial policy towards
sheltered sub-industries would be more complete if
supplemented with estimates on regulation. A
framework for doing this is presented in section A.2.3.
Imperfect competition in the ERA model
Chapter 5 concludes that mark-up pricing is common in
many service markets, exposed as well as sheltered.
This violates the central assumptions in the ERA model
of perfect competition and unit cost pricing. The model
in its present form transforms changes in unit costs
from altered support into price variations in the case of
sheltered industries, or factor income variations in the
case of exposed industries. In industries characterised
by imperfect competition, unit cost variations may both
affect prices and mark-ups, the latter being part of
factor income. This indicates a need for some hybrid
price determination model, that would divide effects of
assistance into price and mark-up shifts. Price
determination in markets with imperfect competition
will depend on the demand structure. The ERA model
in its existing form provides no such information and
will not be able to determine the degree to which
mark-ups and prices change. For this an extended
model would be required. An additional severe
problem arises from the fact that changes in assistance
may not only affect the magnitude of mark-ups and
prices, but may change the very nature of price-setting
behaviour in the industry. The structure of imperfectly
competitive markets may be very sensitive to changing
circumstances. This complicates analyses of assistance
to service industries, as hypothetical changes in the
competitive structure of markets are difficult to predict.
Further, there exists no obvious solution to how
different market structure models within one industry
aggregate should be weighted.
The indivisibility of unit cost changes presented above
is only part of the insufficiency of the ERA model in
case of imperfect competition. Another and far more
serious problem is the impairment of the indicative
ability of the ERA model. The original purpose of ERA
calculations is to grasp the allocative implications of
industrial policy. An attempt to define an indicator of
structural changes from industrial assistance in
presence of monopolistic competition is made in
Hægeland (1995). Experience shows that the
complexity and input requirements are high related to
the predictive ability of the indicator.
In spite of our arguing that the assumption of perfect
competition is generally less realistic for services than
for goods, we will not suggest to work further on
including imperfectly competitive markets in the ERA
model. Thus, the two categories of price modelling in
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the ERA model must embrace all the service industries,
as well. They are both implicitly based on assumptions
of perfectly substitutable services, perfect competition
among firms and constant returns to scale
technologies. Services will therefore fall into one of the
following two categories:
1) For tradable services prices are determined by world
market prices inclusive of natural trade barrier
costs, as well as penetration costs of trade policy
measures. Industries producing tradable services as
main commodities (exposed industries) will shift
unit cost changes on to primary factor income.
2) Naturally sheltered industries shift all unit cost
changes on to prices, while primary factor rewards
remain unaltered. This price model may also be
assigned to an industry producing potential
tradables as main commodities, as long as it is
politically sheltered. That is, its main commodities
are untraded due to sustained
prohibitive/quantitative political trade barriers.
Regulations in an ERA context
Regulation of the sheltered service sector is not yet
included in the ERA analyses. An operational definition
of regulations for the purpose of ERA calculations
leaves out regulations that merely have the effect of
influencing the characteristics or identity of the market
participants, and focuses only on the effects on market
outcomes (i.e. prices, mark-ups and quantities). Market
outcome changes from altering regulations may well be
a consequence of changes in the industrial organisation
and price-setting rules, per se.
The task in an ERA study is to quantify the changes in
prices and factor income per unit induced by moving
from a reference regime influenced by the existing
industrial policy, including regulations, to an
alternative hypothetical policy regime. According to
our ERA tradition, the following alternative regimes
would be relevant:
1. Net subsidies eliminated, all other measures,
including regulations, maintained.
2. Discriminatory electricity prices eliminated, all
other measures maintained.
3. Trade policies eliminated, all other measures
maintained.
4. Regulations eliminated, all other measures
maintained.
5. All industrial policies, including regulations,
eliminated.
Regulations may take 3 forms, distinguished by the
mechanisms through which they affect market
outcomes:
• price-regulations are regulations exercised directly
on prices, by e.g. fixing the prices, price growth or
price gaps between two states.
• quantity-regulations regulate quantities, e.g. by
imposing minimum or maximum supply limits or by
assigning quotas to particular market agents.
• mark-up-regulations fix the (maximum) gap
between unit (or marginal) costs and prices.
The third class of regulations is only an option
whenever the market structure is imperfectly
competitive. Such regulations are rare, owing to the
fact that mark-ups are difficult to survey.
In section A.2.2 we recommend to keep intact the
assumptions in the ERA model of perfect competition
and constant returns to scale technologies. There are
two implications related to omitting the possibility of
mark-up pricing. First, mark-up regulations may only
be studied in an ad hoc manner. Second, combined
price/mark-up effects like those described in section
A.2.2 will have to be substituted by pure price changes.
Estimates of policy effects related to regulations would
of course become less accurate by restricting the scope
of modelling. The modelling task would, however,
become easier. Below we depict a framework for
studying policy changes to regimes 1 through 5 above,
under the assumptions of perfect competition. Sources
of bias due to this assumption are pointed out
wherever necessary.
Analyses of moving to regime 1, 2 or 3 require first,
information on the market price in the reference
regime. This is in principle observable. Second, the
policy changes must be quantified. The quantification
methods are familiar from previous ERA studies. Third,
information on the mechanisms that are triggered in
case of moving to regimes 1,2 and 3 is required. These
will depend on the nature of the maintained regula-
tions. Analogously to the case of protection (see e.g.
Fæhn et al. (1995), section 2.1), the mechanisms
induced by other policy changes will depend on
whether the regulations are price-regulations or
quantity-regulations. Here we also have a third option,
mark-up-regulations. Even though mark-up-regulations
are directly ignored due to the assumption of perfect
competition, policy changes in presence of such
regulations may be studied in an ad hoc manner, as
changes in mark-ups would be controlled exogenously
by the regulations. Thus, regardless of the competitive
structure, the familiar situation for sheltered industries
applies. Unit cost changes are fully shifted on to prices,
and ERAs are by definition zero. Also in case of main-
tained quantity regulations and no mark-ups, the effects
of unit cost changes are shifted on to prices. In a hypo-
thetical model of imperfect competition with possible
changes in mark-ups this would result in ERAs different
from zero and modified price changes. In case of price
regulations, changes in unit costs shift fully on to factor
income, and ERAs may be calculated. This applies
regardless of the competitive structure. To conclude, in
a perfect competition model, the interesting novel
achievement from including regulations in partial
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policy analyses is that we may calculate ERAs for price-
regulated sheltered industries. Other sheltered
industries will, as before, obtain zero ERAs.
A study of movements to regime 4, where all regulations
are removed, requires quantification of the resulting
price shift. The regulated case is represented by the
observed price. It reflects either the regulated price or
the equivalent price of the quantity regulation. Mark-up
regulations may not be studied, as mark-ups are by
definition zero under both regimes. In case of no
regulations, the price would adjust to the new regime.
Estimating the hypothetical price of regime 4 would
require a specified underlying hypothesis on the
alternative market structure. Whether observed proxies
to this price exist, depends on the specific interpretation
of the situation. One might be able to extract relevant
information on the unregulated regime 4 from prices of
particular market participants, prices in other countries
or observations from the past. By assuming constant unit
costs, the estimated price shift will be fully reflected in
factor income changes, and ERAs from regulations - or
effective rates of regulations - may be calculated. This is
true regardless of the competitive structure and the
element of mark-ups in the two compared prices.
Regulations, as well as all other industrial policy, are
removed in regime 5. Above, we commented on the
calculation of price effects and consequent ERA
reflections from removing regulations. When regulations
are absent in a perfect competition ERA model,
removing all other industrial policy would result in price
shifts in the sheltered industries. The industries would
obtain ERAs only from the removal of regulations, while
the other changes would not contribute to ERAs, but to
price shifts. However, a model with mark-up pricing
would possibly result in some mark-up changes that
could modify these price shifts.
Proper modelling of regulations of sheltered industries,
which mainly produce services, would require modelling
of various imperfectly competitive market structures.
This would represent a task far beyond the present
ambitions of ERA analyses. In particular, the demand
side would have to be involved. As emphasised in section
A.2.2, calculating indicators in case of imperfect
competition have not proved to be very fruitful. In light
of this, we have considered the possibility of including
regulations, while maintaining the assumptions of
perfect competition and constant returns to scale. We
will emphasise that the deviance between market
outcomes of such approximations and the real market
structures may be considerable'.
26 To grasp the magnitude of the errors made, empirical testing of
different models of the existing market structures should be done. The
hypothetical cases may in general not be tested, and modelling would
have to rely on competent guessing. By comparing market outcomes of
the probable market structures with the approximation of perfect
competition, an indication of the deviance may be achieved.
To conclude, as long as perfect competition is assumed,
modelling of regulations would in principle be feasible
and could be regarded as an improvement of the study.
Quantifying the effects of other industrial policy
measures under the presence of regulations would not
involve new methodological problems. The quantifi-
cation of the effects of regulations per se would
however introduce new challenges of estimating price
gaps, as the alternative price in absence of regulations
is unobservable. We would not avoid conjecturing on
the most probable market structures and outcomes.
The task of quantifying regulatory measures may
involve considerable efforts, but should be practicable.
Protection of services in an ERA context
While the ERA model previously has been used to study
protection of tradable goods, a reclassification will
render quantification and modelling of protection in
several service industries imperative. The problems
associated with mark-up pricing will be of relevance
also when quantifying effects of protection. By
maintaining the assumptions of the ERA-model,
however, protection of services may be modelled
analogously to protection of goods. As for the case of
goods, NTBs on services may be divided into
quantitative/prohibitive measures on the one side and
measures increasing penetration costs on the other. As
pointed out in Section A.1, it is important to make this
distinction in relation to ERA, as the two classes of
measures have qualitatively different effects.
Quantitative measures include prohibitions or quotas
on selling or establishing in the country or on
consumption of foreign services. Also all rules which
practically exclude all foreign competition (prohibitive
measures) function in a similar manner. Penetration
costs do not prohibit imports, but merely increase the
costs of buying the foreign service. They may shift the
type of foreign competition to a less efficient one or
they may shift the origin of services to relatively high-
cost producers27 .
Absence of trade is not a sufficient indication of
protection, as absence of trade may result from
persisting natural barriers. The only way to state
whether and to what extent protection exists, is to
quantify the costs of natural barriers and compare
these to the price gaps between domestic and foreign
prices. A possible deviance may be ascribed to present
trade barriers. A mapping of the trading environment
for each service industry is presented in section 6.5.
The method of quantifying NTBs would be the same for
services as for goods. However, in case of services, this
method is both principally and practically problematic.
The principle hesitation is first of all associated with
27 This may be the case if trade policy discriminates with respect to
nationality. For instance, prohibiting imports from countries
potentially supplying at lowest costs, will shift costs upwards to the
import cost of the (cheapest) allowed imports.
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the exclusion of differentiated products in the ERA
model. In reality, existence of product differentiation
makes it troublesome to distinguish between natural
and political barriers. One may always argue that the
domestic service is not totally comparable to foreign
substitutes, thus having its own market. If incumbent
firms tend to be of domestic origin, claims of discrimi-
nation may well occur even if the present incumbents
are the natural ones. Due to the heterogeneous
character of services, local and cultural proximity may
play a decisive role in the competition between two
services produced domestically and abroad. If the two
services cover the same need, their prices may be
compared. Here we encounter another principle
hesitation: In case of experience goods, like most
services, the satisfaction of needs cannot be evaluated
unless the service is already consumed. Hence, price
comparisons ex ante are impossible.
Even if the principal doubt on the fruitfulness of
identifying protection is rejected, practical problems
remain. First, one must set up a sufficiently exhaustive
list of quality aspects that comparable services must
possess28 . Second, their prices included natural
transaction costs must be quantified. As for goods,
there are problems related to collecting price data (see
Fæhn et al. (1995) p. 18) . Additional problems apply to
service prices. First, service transaction costs largely
consist of costs associated with interaction (for
example costs of cultural barriers), which are
extremely difficult to measure. One solution might be
to compare services in nations with close cultural and
linguistic relations. Second, the fact that foreign
competition may take on several forms (see section 3),
makes the scope of price mapping comprehensive. If
prices on foreign supply are observed, it must be neatly
considered whether more effective forms (or origins) of
potential supply are excluded29 .
Provided our recommendations concerning
reclassification of several services are carried out, the
need for quantifying possible protection follows. As
outlined above, many particular aspects of services
would complicate this task, when compared to
quantifying protection of goods.
28 International agreements on governmental procurement suggest
such a procedure. Tenders fulfilling some detailed specifications
should be ranked and given preference with respect to price .
29 An analogous aspect is also present for goods, in case of
discriminatory protection with respect to nation of origin.
Summing up the suggestions
The appendix is devoted to designing a framework for
implementation of our conclusions into the ERA model
of Statistics Norway. We make some suggestions
concerning a tentative new division between exposed
and sheltered industries. A more extensive mapping of
data would be required if the division was to be further
refined. Within each service aggregate of the model,
the degree of tradability seems to vary. Thus, we
recommend a division of most service industries into
one sheltered and one exposed sub-industry. For the
exposed part of the service sector, possible protection
rates will have to be quantified. Several policy
instruments directed towards sheltered industries,
commonly termed regulations, may also be introduced.
We provide a framework for including regulations and
protection based on the present assumptions of the
ERA model. This includes the assumption of perfect
competition, which we recommend to maintain. The
very idea of the ERA model as well as the simplicity
relies on this assumption of perfect competition, and
experience has shown us that the incorporation of
alternative price determination models is complex.
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